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This work uses  developmental state’s paradigm in explaining how development in 
the Third World should be understood as a process in which states have to play strategic roles 
in planning and sustaining economic development. By comparing Botswana and Nigeria, the 
work establishes how the nature and character of techno-bureaucratic governance become 
necessary in the emergence and sustenance of developmental state in Africa. Such 
developmental oriented technocracy and bureaucracy should not only be autonomous and 
constitute the Weberian ideal bureaucracy, but must also be powerful, highly professional and 
technically competent.  
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Introduction 
Development theory and policy debate over the years have remained contentious 
between the neoclassical paradigm and the “institutional” development theorists. Though, the 
Institutional development theory was the dominant orthodoxy during the 1950s and early 
1960s, the neoclassical paradigm and the neoliberal economic measures associated with it, 
dominates development theory and policy in the late 1960s, especially after the emergence of 
a unipolar world, to the contemporary time. This prevailing development paradigm tends to 
view the state involvement in the economy as negative and therefore should be minimalistic 
in nature, quite against the belief of the “institutionalists” who contend that market failure is 
responsible for underdevelopment, so the state should play important roles in enhancing 
development. Thus, as a major protagonist of the neoclassical development paradigm and 
neoliberal economic measures, the World Bank argues especially in suggesting the cure for 
the problem of development in Africa a substantial retraction of authority and reach of the 
state through the privatization of public enterprises (World Bank, 1989). 
Four different factors were responsible for the dominance of the debate on the best 
theory and policy thrust for economic development by the neoclassical orthodoxy over the 
Institutional theory or developmental state theorists, at least from the beginning of the 1970s 
up to the turn of the 21st century. First, was the collapse of many centrally planned economies 
in the socialist states.Second, the failure of extensive state intervention in promoting import- 
substituting industrialization which had instead generated inefficient industries that must be 
bailed out with unproductive interventionist funds from the state. Third, “rent seeking” 
generated by cases of extensive involvement of the state intervention in the economies as a 
major agent of industrialisation. Fourth, empirical evidence on the experience of the most 
successful countries to emerge from the Third World (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and 
Singapore) which showed that these countries have achieved economic development through 
an outward-oriented measures driven by a free market and private sector (Onis, 1991). 
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However, the failure of the neoliberal economic measures to rejuvenate the economies 
of most of the Third World countries, a reinterpretation of the East Asian development 
experience and the emerging interests of political scientist to lookat the political 
characteristics of economically more successful developing countries have enhanced the 
emergence of a counter-critique of the neoclassical paradigm and the reemergence of the 
relevance of the developmental state thesis. Central to the position of the counter-critique of 
the neoclassical development paradigm is the argument that the development in the Third 
World should be understood as a process in which states have to play a strategic role in 
planning and sustaining economic development. This can be achieved by the developmental 
state which according to Adrian Leftwich “has sufficient power, probity, autonomy and 
competence at the centre to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit and 
nationally-determined development objectives, whether by establishing and promoting the 
conditions of economic growth, by organizing it directly, or by a varying combination of 
both” (Leftwich,  1994:381). This state is what De Onis (1999) refers to as a state where 
government is intimately involved in macro and micro economic planning in order to grow 
the economy. Chalmers Johnson distinguishes the “developmental orientation” of such a state 
from the socialist type command economy state, on the one hand, and the capitalist regulatory 
orientation on the other hand (Johnson, 1982: 19). 
The developmental state orthodoxy suggests that for a state to be a developmental 
state, it must be stronger and autonomous state. An autonomous state enhanced by a 
powerful, efficient and autonomous bureaucracy recruited from the best talents available in 
the state. The bureaucracy and those with economics and technical expertise are given 
prominent roles in policy formulation and implementation in the developmental state. 
Technocrats and bureaucrats involvements in development process in a developmental state 
become invaluable because development planning requires a high level of economic and 
technical expertise. Thus, according to Peter Evans “the idea of developmental state puts 
robust, competent public institutions at the centre of the development matrix” (Evans, 
2003:37). This is what Jayasuriya (2006) puts succinctly when he underlines the fact that 
institutions become the key to explaining development outcomes. Kunle Amuwo (2007) toes 
similar part when he holds strongly that “without a seasoned and development-oriented 
bureaucracy, state interventionism would, in all probability, amount to little more than the 
unwitting transfer of public resources to local capitalist class” (Amuwo, 2007:11). 
Going by the above position, it is suggestive to note that extant literature on 
developmental state establish the fact thattechnocracy and an autonomous and efficient 
bureaucracy remain prime institution for the achievement of development by a state. 
However, it is important to point out that it would be grossly misleading and rather too 
simplistic to empahasise apparently technocratic and bureaucratic factors as a sine qua non 
for development by deemphasising the necessary political requirements of development. 
Therefore in order to take a holistic understanding of the process of development through the 
developmental state paradigm, the primacy of the nature, character, structure and purposes of 
the state which tend to concentrate in the state both the political will and the bureaucratic 
competence to establish developmental momentum must also be considered. Therefore 
explicitly there is a close link between politicsand institutions ability to achieve development. 
Politics here is largely viewed within the context of the usage of the term by Adrian Leftwich 
as “all activities of conflict, cooperation and negotiation involved in the use, production and 
distribution of resources, whether material or ideal, and whether at local, national or 
international levels” (Leftwich, 1994:365). 
Apparently, I hold unequivocally that there is a political base of the developmental 
state if technocrats and bureaucrats are considered relevant tools in the process of 
development. The relative autonomy of technocrats and bureaucrats in the formulation and 
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implementation of development policy is clearly the function of their political origins and the 
coalitions which supports them, while the authority and insulation of their economic high 
commands has flowed from the political power and support of the central political executives. 
The ability of the technocrats and the bureaucrats to deal with both the civil society and in 
particular with local and foreign interests, there is the need of political supports (Leftwich, 
1995).  
The relevancy of politics for a developmental state orthodoxy can also be located in 
the Peter Evans “embedded autonomous” argument which characterizes the relationship 
between the techno-bureaucratic elements and the private sector in the process of economic 
policy making and implementation. These institutions selectively link up with segments of 
civil society whose active involvement in the economy is necessary for productive 
transformation (Samatar, 1999:27). It is thus, the political base of the techno-bureaucratic 
structure that would guide against the overwhelming of the policy making process by a 
particularistic interest groups in the “embedded relationship” arising from the public-private 
partnership in the developmental process. 
What the argument in the above paragraph suggests is that the processes involved in 
developmental policy making are to a large extent political in nature. Malcolm Wallis (1989) 
illustrates this when he underlines that “to understand how planning function it is important 
to be able to analyse it within its political context” (1989:45). The political context of a 
developmental state becomes more relevant upon the backdrop of the fact that it is possible 
for a state to have developmental structures without achieving development. Therefore any 
consideration of the state as developmental with the technocrats and bureaucrats as its 
containers must also clearly considers the importance of the nature and character of the state 
and politics in this process. It is on this premise that this chapter intends assessing the nature 
and character of techno-bureaucratic governance in Botswana and Nigeria in order to 
establish whether technocracy and bureaucracy in these countries represent structures that can 
enhance development. 
  
Nature and Character of Techno-Bureaucratic Governance in Botswana 
As I have stated under the introduction of this chapter technocracy and bureaucracy 
are important elements for a state to experience rapid economic growth and development 
through state-led policies and/or interventions.While I subscribe to the recommendation of an 
autonomous technocracy and the Weberian Ideal bureaucracy for the establishment and 
maintenance of a developmental state, I suggest that an autonomous and the Weberian ideal 
bureaucracy are not enough conditions for a state to be “developmental. This however, is not 
to water down the significance of an autonomous technocracy and Weberianness. This 
position only demonstrates that an autonomous technocracy and the Weberian ideal 
bureaucracy are not enough for a state-led development through techno-bureaucratic 
governance. Such developmental oriented technocracy and bureaucracy should not only be 
autonomous and constitute the Weberian ideal bureaucracy, but must also be powerful, highly 
professional and technically competent. 
Amuwo (2008) regards these type of technocracy and bureaucracy as critical elements 
of state capacity when he opines that “an efficient, capable, disciplined, professional, skilled, 
and relatively autonomous bureaucracy, driven by a nationalistic political elite that privileges 
economic development” (2008:11).Therefore, the nature and character of technocracy and 
bureaucracy in Botswana as well as Nigeria shall be viewed in the context of their autonomy, 
Weberian ideal/rationality, professionalism, real power, authority and technical 
competence.These characteristics of technocracy and bureaucracy shall be examined with the 
view of establishing how these reflect in policies formulation, implementation and 
development planning. 
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An extremely meritocratic form of recruitment constitutes the starting point in 
understanding the developmental oriented type of bureaucracy under this discourse. The 
popular computer software terminology of “Garbage-in-Garbage-out” is relevant explaining 
how recruitment of technocrats and bureaucrats affect public service performance. The point 
being stressed here is that technocracy competence and bureaucratic efficiency are achieved 
by, among other things through the process of recruitment into the bureaucracy and the 
caliber of people appointed into cabinet positions. Thus the foremost factor that shaped the 
nature and character of technocracy and bureaucracy is the meritocratic recruitment. As 
Charles Harvey and Stephen Lewis (1990) remark, in Botswana, “considerable attention was 
paid, particularly within the civil service and the cabinet to putting able people into key 
positions and keeping them there for extended periods” (1990:9).Thus, the Botswana’s 
bureaucracy to a very large extent possesses one of the major characteristics of the Weberian 
ideal bureaucracy in the area of the appointment of personnel on the basis of qualification and 
experience. 
This meritocratic recruitment into the civil service and cabinet positions in Botswana 
can be traced to the immediate post independence years of the country. Unlike much of the 
rest of African countries which embarked on the localization of their civil service 
immediately after independence at the expense of merit, Botswana embarked on gradual 
localization of its public service. Localising the public service in most of these African 
countries entailed quick and massive appointment and promotion of indigeneous bureaucrats 
in the military or civil service to positions previously occupied by white colonialists 
(Samatar, 1999). Botswana did not thread this pact followed by most African countries in 
order to enhance the efficiency and competence of the public service. The first President of 
the country, Seretse Khama clearly established this when he declared in 1967 that, “we would 
never sacrifice efficiency on the altar of localization” (Picard, 1987:205). 
Therefore, in order to establish and develop a highly competent technocracy and 
bureaucracy and development planning, expatriates were retained in the Botswana Public 
service. The level of the total adherence to meritocratic appointment into the country’s public 
service was displayed with the headship of the Botswana civil service by a white Kenyan for 
several years after the country’s independence. These expatriates were only replaced 
whenever capable Batswanas were available to fill the positions occupied by the expatriates. 
The expatriates also assisted in building a very effective bureaucracy by training the local 
cadre of bureaucrats who later on take over the running of the country. As Du Toit (1995) 
suggests, the role of expatriates as upholders of the technical (and technocratic) standards of 
efficiency and effectiveness contribute to the functioning of the civil service as an effective 
and autonomous corporate group. 
Apart from the meritocratic recruitment into the public service there is also high 
consideration for merit in the promotion of personnel in the service. As Balefi Tsie notes, 
“there are clear career paths and conditions of service for almost all categories of public 
servants” (1998:13). In the Botswana’s public service therefore, there are clear guidelines for 
promotions in the service, which is quite different from promotions based on patronage 
and/or ethnic considerations obtainable in most of the African countries. Line ministries in 
the Botswana’s public service set up their own promotion boards. The promotion boards 
comprised senior officers within the ministry and members of the Directorate of Public 
Service Management (DPSM), acting as support officers. This promotion boards review all 
promotions to ensure that deserving staff have been promoted, in order to drastically reduce 
biasness, victimisation and political considerations in the promotion processes (Scher, 
2010).Promotion based on merit had to a very large extent increased the level of commitment 
of the bureaucrats and also ensures thatcompetent people are promoted to relevant positions. 
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In order for a bureaucracy to the efficient and effective there is also the need for 
continous training of the bureaucrats and for a developmental oriented technocrats training 
and updating of their technical expertise remains cardinal. As it is a common knowledge 
formulation and implemention of development policies require up to date technical and 
professional expertise, it therefore becomes pertinent for officers responsible for planning and 
development to updates themselves with relevant knowledge surrounding the demands of the 
position they occupy. The basis of such training and development is necessarily to improve 
motivation, performance and productivity of the technocrats and bureaucrats. Foremost post 
independence Botswana technocrats and bureaucrats have taken training and personal 
development with utmost required attentions. As Harvey and Lewis (1990) point out;  
“for more than a decade after independence it was common for visiting consultants or 
academics to give evening seminars attended by Ministers, Permanent Secretaries 
and other senior officials. In addition senior, meetings of cabinet frequently involved 
presentations by visiting experts, who were encouraged to share the comparative 
experiences of other countries both in Africa and all other parts of the world” 
(Harvey and Lewis, 1990:61) 
More so, as Kempe Hope (1995) holds, the University of Botswana was established in 
1982 among other things to perform the function of improving the quality and in expanding 
the quantity of the human resources needed for development. According to her “the 
university is used as a training institution for public servants, primarily for senior staff 
seeking professional and intellectual development in advanced public administration” 
(1995:57). Similarly, DPSM and ULCS engage in the training and education of public 
servants. The Botswana Institute of Administration and Commerce (BIAC) as well as the 
Institute of Development Management (IDM) also engage in training of the public servants in 
similar ways that the DPSM and ULCS does. Thus, in order to be developmental oriented 
high premium is placed on education and training of the technocrats and bureaucrats in 
Botswana. With the emphasis on education and training the Batswana public service enjoys 
the benefit of the supply of educated and competent individuals occupying various positions 
in the service. 
The Botswana’s technocrats and bureaucrats also possess and improve their technical 
orientations through the “parallel progression” framework (Hope, 1995; Adamolekun, 1999). 
The PP framework is an incentive to provide career prospects for some specifically identified 
officers like artisans, technicians and professionals (notably accountants, engineers, architects 
and lawyers), by giving them the opportunity to progress upwards via two parallel lines in 
these relative areas of scarce manpower. The professional grades for these categories of 
official were opened up by three new grades, offering an optimum salary that was about 45% 
higher than the old salary grades of these categories of staff (Adamolekun, 1999).The basic 
objective of this framework is to attract and retain qualified and experienced officers with 
scarce skill who are required for economic development.  
With the PP scheme the Botswana public service has been able to retain the services 
of qualified technical expertise and professionals in its fold especially with the gradual 
growth of the private sector. The PP has assisted the Botswana public service in not losing 
some of its capable hands to the private sector as witnessed in some other African countries. 
This is due to the recognition of the fact by the technocrats and professionals that the 
incentives and benefits they are receiving in the public sector is not different from what is 
obtainable in the private sector. In view of this, the Botswana public service can still boast of 
technically sound personnel and professional who continuously make the techno-bureaucratic 
governance development oriented. 
From the foregoing it is never a misnomer to attest that the merit based appointments 
and promotion of technocrats and bureaucrats, their training and the reward system for 
European Scientific Journal  August 2014  /SPECIAL/ edition   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
262 
technicians and professionals have remained crucial in making techno-bureaucratic 
governance an important element in the developmental state of Botswana. In view of this, 
Botswana can rightly be said to have a powerful, competent and economic insulated 
bureaucracy which qualifies the country as a developmental state going by Adrian Leftwich 
(1995) six major components of a developmental state. Attention will however be shifted to 
an assessment of the impacts of the nature and character of technocracy and bureaucracy on 
the developmental policy making process in Botswana under the next section of this chapter. 
 
Technocrats and Bureaucrats in the Development Process of Botswana 
One of the basic characteristics of the Weberian ideal/legal rational bureaucracy is 
that bureaucrats should be politically neutral. That is, bureaucrats are not expected to be 
involved in the process of policy making, but rather they are only expected to implement 
policies made by the executive arm of government. What this suggests is that the elected 
political executives or appointed cabinet ministers are expected to make laws, while the 
bureaucrats take order from the executive for the implementation of the policies formulated. 
The top bureaucrats could at best play advisory roles to the politicians in the process of policy 
making. Going by this Weberian’s principle of political neutrality for bureaucrats, it is only 
technocrats who are appointed by the executive head of government as cabinet ministers that 
can play any major role in the process of policy formulation.  
The developmental state literature however negates this principle of political 
neutrality for bureaucrats in the process of developmental policy formulation and 
implementation. Instead of only focusing on the implementation of policy by the bureaucrats, 
the developmental state’s orthodoxy holds strongly that bureaucrats remain necessary 
institutions for a state to achieve development. It is within this context that an attempt would 
be made under this section to examine the roles of the technocrats as well as the bureaucrats 
in the process of developmental policy making and implementation in Botswana, which have 
to a large extent assisted in enhancing the movement of the country from the league of one of 
the poorest countries in Africa in 1966 to that of one of the most prosperous country on the 
continent.  
Theoretically, the Botswana’s bureaucracy has been modeled along the Weberian’s 
Principle of political neutrality, but as Somolekae (1993) remarks neutrality and autonomy 
remain relative concepts in Botswana. According to her, since independence, the official 
position of the government is that policy making is the function of the politicians while the 
bureaucrats should only be responsible for policy implementation. However, available 
empirical evidences show that in practice the bureaucrats and not the political leadership have 
dominated policy making in the country. Gilfred Gunderson clearly refers to Botswana as an 
“administrative state” in which “the administrative elites have complete control over the 
decision making process” (1971:7). And for Louis Picard the Botswana’s bureaucracy 
remains “a major factor in policy-making process and a policy dominated socio-economic 
group” (1987:13).  
Going from this,from the early years of Botswana’s independence as I have noted 
earlier the expatriates who dominated the Botswana’s bureaucracy were largely responsible 
for the formulation of policies and implementation, while according to Isaksen (1981:32) 
“politicians mobilized support at the polls. For instance as Charles Harvey explains, during 
the early years of Botswana’s independence, the expatriate advisers briefed the cabinet and 
Members of Parliament on the technicalities and potentialities of macro policy. On the basis 
of this, policy options and responses are chosen.This tradition established at independence by 
the expatriates has remained to the present. The only major difference as correctly noted by 
Somolekae (1993:116) is that “the civil service contains far more African today than it did at 
independence”. Thus development policy formulation and implementation have been 
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dominated by the technocrats and bureaucrats who are to a large extent technocratic in their 
modes of operation. 
The roles of the bureaucrats and technocrats become more relevant in policy 
formulation and implementation when the government of Botswana had to (re)invent its 
institutions to move from routine administration to that of development planning and 
management. This transformation which took many years has the Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning (MFDP) as its brain trust. The MFDP has remained important in 
directing the process of development in Botswana (Raphaeli et al, 1984; Holm, 1988; 
Samatar, 1999; Taylor, 2002; 2003; 2005; 2012; Sebudubudu &Molutsi, 2009). The MFDP 
headed by the Vice-President is responsible for planning, budgeting and coordinates all 
development activities. The ministry also carefully monitors the implementations of all 
development projects. The overall mandate of the Ministry is to coordinate national 
developmentplanning, mobilise and prudently manage available financial and 
economicresources. Further to that the Ministry is responsible for the formulation ofeconomic 
and financial policies for sustainable economic development. 
To ensure that the MFDP’s remains effective in spearheading development agenda, 
there are planning units, staffed by professional planners responsible to the director of 
Economic Affairs of MFDP, in other ministries (Samatar, 1999). This ministry which is the 
driving force behind Botswana’s development is most often than not headed and dominated 
by seasoned technocrats and bureaucrats. In fact in the exception of Ian Khama, the office of 
the Vice-President and Minister of Finance and Development Planning has been mostly 
reserved for seasoned bureaucrats and technocrats who occupied that position for 
considerable number of years (Taylor, 2003; 2009). Such technocrats include Quett Masire 
who was a founder and principal of Seepapitso Secondary school, African Echo journalist and 
director, and editor of Therisanyo (Democratic Party Newspaper) (Answers.Com, 2013). 
Festus Mogae who was planning officer Ministry of Finance and Development planning 
(1970), secretary economic affairs MFDP (1972-74), Permanent Secretary MFDP (1975-76), 
Permanent Secretary MFDP (1989-98) (Answers.Com, 2013), before becoming the Vice-
President and Minster of Finance for this same MFDP in which he has being a bureaucrat 
occupying different positions for several years. Peter Mmusi who resigned in 1993 was also 
the Vice-President and Minister of Finance and Development Planning.  
In fact during the period when Ian Khama was the Vice-President, because he was not 
a technocrat, the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning was separated from the 
Vice-President’s portfolio and a technocrat Baledzi Gaolathe was appointed as a substantive 
Minister of the MFDP. Gaolathe before becoming the Minister of Finance and Development 
Planning has served as the Governor of the Bank of Botswana (1997-1999) and a Member 
World Bank Board (1999). Similarly, Lt General Mompati Merafhe who was the Vice-
President to Ian Khama but who was not also the Minister of Finance and Development 
Planning from 2008 to 2012 has to be replaced with a technocrat Kedikilwe Ponatshego in 
2012 because among other things the former’s lack of bureaucratic and technocratic 
background to efficiently oversee the MFDP and eventually succeed Ian Khama as the 
President. Kedikiliwe has before becoming the Vice-President and the Minister of Finance 
and Development was a career bureaucrat who has served as Assistant Principal, Ministry of 
Finance and Development Planning (1970-73), Principal Officer MFDP (1973-75), Director 
of Financial Affairs MFDP (1976-77) and Permanent Secretary Ministry of Works and 
Communication (1977-78), etc (Brillonline, 2013). 
When Kedikilwe was sworn-in as the Vice-President and the Minister of Finance and 
Development Planning, the government still retained him in his initial position as the 
Minister of Minerals, Energy and Water Resources before a substantive Minister was 
appointed to the Ministry.According to the government“this will allow him to continue to 
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play a key role in efforts to promote greater beneficiation along with growth in the local 
mineral and energy sectors, including Botswana's emergence as a mines to market global 
diamond trading and processing hub” (Scoop World, 6 August 2012:1). Given these 
illustrations, it is quite correct to assert that this powerful MFDP and other development 
related Ministries like Ministry of Energy and Water Resources have been dominated by 
professional bureaucrats and seasoned technocrats who determine developmental policy 
options and the direction of Botswana’s economy. 
More so, it is instructive to point out that the separation of the Ministry of Finance 
and Development Planning from the office of the Vice-President when Ian Khama and 
Mompati Merafhe were Vice-Presidents shows the importance that the government placed on 
the reservation of office for technocrats and bureaucrats. What this quite exemplified is that 
the role of development planning has been entirely reserved for technocrats and bureaucrats 
who are trained and have the expertise in economic policy making, in Botswana. Thus, it is 
never an accident of history that the MFDP has been entirely occupied by bureaucrats and 
technocrats since Botswana’s independence in 1966 to date. Thus, ‘such a Ministry and its 
close links to the Executive has secured a balance between development planning and 
budgeting, as well as strengthening the capacity to implement national goals and 
demonstrating a commitment to economic development’ (Taylor, 2003:4). 
Aside the domination of critical ministries that determine the economic development 
direction of Botswana by technocrats and bureaucrats, parastatals and boards relevant for the 
formulation and implementation of policies for economic development are headed and their 
composition dominated by technocrats and bureaucrats. One of such parastatal is the Bank of 
Botswana. The Bank of Botswana like any other Central Bank has the primary objectives of 
promoting and maintaining low and stable inflation, ensure anefficient payments system and 
keep the banking system safe and sound. To achieve these objectives,the Bank undertakes a 
number of functions, which include: formulating and implementing monetary policy, issuing 
currency, supervising and regulating commercial banks and other financial institutions, 
serving as economic and financial advisor to Government, implementing exchange rate 
policy and managing foreign exchange reserves (Bank of Botswana, 2007). The critical roles 
of this Bank in determining the economic direction of Botswana cannot be overemphasized. 
The importance of this institution is consistently matched with the culture of appointing 
bureaucrats as its Governor. For instance Mrs Linah Mohohlo who was appointed as the 
Bank’s Governor in 1999 has been at the central bank for 23 years as a civil servant 
occupying different positions. This means that she has been a bureaucrat at the Bank for more 
than 35 years (Bank of Botswana, 2012). Her predecessor as the Bank’s Governor Baledzi 
Gaolethe was also a renowned bureaucrat who has served in various capacities at the Ministry 
of Finance and Development Planning before becoming the Governor of the Bank. 
 Another reference point where technocrats and bureaucrats have constituted important 
elements in Botswana’s development process is their important representation in the 
DEBSWANA Board of Directors. The DEBSWANA Board of Directors consists of 13 
members, with 6 of its members being the Botswana’s government nominees. Due to the 
importance of the mining industry and the premium placed on the important roles of 
technocrats and bureaucrats in determining the country’s development these nominees are 
always technocrats and bureaucrats. I will make reference to the technocratic and 
bureaucratic backgrounds of the 2009 government nominees to the DEBSWANA Board of 
Directors to support this argument. Eric Molale who is one of the government’s nominees to 
the Board was a District Commissioner Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing in 
1991, Private Secretary MFDP in 1994, Chief Economist MFDP in 1994, Deputy Permanent 
Secretary Ministry of Lands and Housing in 1996 and Permanent Secretary Ministry of Local 
Government, before his appointment. Another nominee Solomon Sekwakwa was a Principal 
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Economist MFDP in 1998 and Secretary Development and Budget Division of the MFDP 
before his appointment (DEBSWANA, 2013).  
Prior to his appointment as a Board member Boikobo Payawas the Permanent 
Secretary in the Ministry of Minerals, Energy and Water Resources, the post he holds 
effective 01 October 2010, was the Deputy Permanent Secretary in the same ministry, 
responsible for water and energy sectors’. Healsoserved, from April 2007 to October 2008, as 
Project Manager; Mmamabula Coordinating Unit, still under the Ministry of Minerals, 
Energy and Water Resources. During that time he was involved in issues of strategic 
importance in the ministry particularly in the water and energy sectors (Funding for 
Morupule B Phase 1, independent power producers (IPP) emergency water supply project, 
water sector institutional reform and preparation of NDP 10 for water, energy and mineral 
sectors). Boikobo Paya was once the Director of the Department of Water Affairs from April 
to 2005 to April 2007, a department under the ministry of Minerals, Energy and Water 
resources. 
Another member of the Board of Directors, Neo D. Moroka is a technocrat who has 
served as the Chief Executive Officer and Resident Director of De Beers Botswana. He 
however started his working career in the public service in 1980. In 1984, he joined Barclays 
Bank and moved up the ranks until he left to work for BP in 1991, first as the General 
Manager for BP Botswana and Managing Director for BP Zambia in 1999 (Ibid).One of the 
female members of the Board of Directors, Athalia Molokomme, taught law at the University 
of Botswana from 1981 - 1996, with periods of study leave in between, and has researched 
and published extensively in the fields of family law, women and law, customary law and 
employment law. In October 2005, she was appointed to the position of Attorney General of 
Botswana. Linah Mohohlo, the Governor of the Bank of Botswana is another female member 
of the Board of Directors (Ibid). Since the Diamond remains the major resources of Botswana 
the roles that these government nominees play in the Board to a large extent determine how 
much benefits the country gets from it natural resources.  
The critical roles of technocrats and bureaucrats in Botswana’s developmental process 
can also be located in the formulation and implementation of National Development Plan 
(NDP). The NDP is five-to-six year rolling plans which focused on an extensive process of 
project selection, prioritization and resource allocation. The planning process of the NDP 
involves a number of discrete steps. According to Sebudubudu and Molutsi (2009) these steps 
include: the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning drafting the Key Issues Paper 
(KIP). This KIP is a general framework which states possible issues to be focused on during 
the coming plan. On the basis of KIP, each sectoral ministry and department are given the 
opportunity to both comment on, and develop their Sectoral Key Issues Papers (SKIPs); on 
the basis of KIP and SKIPs, the MFDP produces Macroeconomic Strategy Paper, which 
defines total estimated cost allocation proposals for each ministry and sector; after this 
second step, the next step will be for each ministry and its broad stakeholders to work 
together to prioritise which programmes and projects will go into the plan; thereafter, these 
programmes and projects would be compiled into a draft plan which goes to the National 
Consultative Forum for discussion and modification. The NCF then has the opportunity to 
question, change and add new programmes and projects across sectors; the draft plan then 
goes to Parliament for debate and final approvals.  
The process of the development of the Key Issues Paper, through the SKIPs up to the 
formulation of the final National Development Plan by the National Consultative Forum is 
dominated by technocrats and bureaucrats in each of these processes. The only role that 
politicians play is only at the level of debate and approval of the NDP in the parliament. In 
view of this, the NDP gives the technocrats and bureaucrats a great degree of roles in policy 
making than the politicians. This presupposes that “a technical document, drafted by experts 
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and then approved by elected representatives, serves as the blueprint for government policy” 
(Taylor 2002:13-14). As Ian Taylorwhile quoting Patrick Molutsi points out “once the new 
plan is approved, politicians’ proposals not in the plan are turned aside on the grounds that 
only emergency measures can be adopted until the next plan is formulated” (Taylor, 2002:14; 
2005:48). 
Similar to the above roles play by technocrats and bureaucrats in the formulation and 
implementation of the NDP is the role of Bureaucrats and technocrats in the area of mineral 
policy. The Mineral Policy Committee (MPC) made up of four Permanent Secretaries, 
undertook all the crucial detailed negotiations with the representatives of interested mining 
companies as well as having day-to-day responsibilities for mineral policy generally 
(Charlton, 1991). The setting up in 1995 of the Botswana Institute of Development Policy 
Analysis (BIDPA), also to some substantial level increases the impacts of technocrats and 
Bureaucrats in the process of development of Botswana. This institute which has a high-
profile board, comprising of the governor of the Bank of Botswana, the managing director of 
the Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Manpower, and the managing 
director of DEBSWANA represents another policy planning and implementation body 
dominated by technocrats and bureaucrats. This BIDPA is dominated by technocrats who 
help to enhance development policy management. The institute also evaluates government 
programmes implemented for some specific periods with an econometric modeling in order 
to enhance government capacity in macroeconomic policy analysis and also domiciled a 
training programme in policy planning andprogramming, in collaboration with the University 
of Botswana (Adamolekun, 1999). 
 
Nature and Character of Techno-Bureaucratic Governance in Nigeria 
Nigeria is a federal state with civil service at the central, state and local government 
levels. Therefore, the Nigerian bureaucracy comprises the federal civil service, thirty-six state 
civil services, 774 local government civil services, several federal and state government 
agencies, parastatals and corporations. An examination of techno-bureaucratic governance 
under this section shall basically focus on the federal civil service, agencies, parastatals and 
corporations. It is however pertinent to point out that the nature and character of techno-
bureaucratic governance at the central level depict what is obtainable at the different states of 
the federation. That is,whatever characteristics and nature of the technocracy and bureaucracy 
at the federal level that I will examine can be used to generalize about the entire bureaucracy 
and technocracy in Nigeria. 
Major discourse under this section shall be adequately based upon the background of 
how a former president of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo aptly describes bureaucracy and 
technocracy in Nigeria when he contends strongly that: 
Over the years, the public services at federal and state levels lost the value on 
which they were established. Merit is sacrificed for expediency and 
opportunism. Retraining of hired staff hardly take place. It allows so-called 
ghost workers to infiltrate the service and ended up with a pay-roll that is 
totally at variance with output or productivity, parastatals are so mismanaged, 
looted, and badly ruined that they became an embarrassment to norms of 
efficiency, productivity, management and probity… Proliferation of 
parastatals as well as the creation of several agencies had resulted in 
unnecessary duplication of functions and in some cases, mandates… The 
management of these agencies appointed persons into the public service 
haphazardly with the result that most of them are now over-bloated and 
enormous resources are spent on their overheads (The Guardian Newspaper 
August 3, 2004). 
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The above statement from the former president of Nigeria shall form our basis of 
analysis and shall be done in a more elaborate form and which shall show a clear picture of 
the nature and character of bureaucracy and technocracy in Nigeria. From a more historical 
perspective, the Nigerian bureaucracy just like its counterpart in most of the post-colonial 
states was a colonial creation, which was not in any way directed toward any developmental 
agenda. It was purely established for the exploitation of these colonies with the mandate of 
maintaining law and order. It was post-independence developmental challenges of the 
country that gave the bureaucracy more roles other than its initial roles for which it was 
created (Fajonyomi, 1998). Immediately after independence, the Nigerian government 
embarked on the policy of indigenization/Nigerianisation of the bureaucracy which further 
placed lots of responsibilities and roles on the few less trained bureaucrats and technocrats. 
However, with an enormous task placed on the Nigerian bureaucracy as the shopping 
floors of government business, Nigeria which at its early years of independence was 
categorized in the middle row of the rich countries in the world, slipped to one of the poorest 
countries in the 21st century, not in term of paucity of resources but on the level of poverty in 
the country. The decline of Nigeria from the league of the richest countries in the world to its 
present state of one of the poorest countries can to a large extent be linked to the nature and 
character of its bureaucracy and technocracy. As I have argued severally and with consensus 
of opinion in the literature that the roles of a competent, meritocratic, well-structured and 
motivated bureaucracy and technocracy are important for a nation to achieve development, 
the present state of underdevelopment of Nigeria can therefore be linked to a bureaucracy 
lacking these fundamental characteristics. I shall in turn discuss some of the characteristics of 
the Nigerian bureaucracy and the nature of it technocracy which have greatly impeded the 
country’s development, especially under its democratic government.  
Public service in Nigeria stipulates a checklist of requirements for entry into the 
service (Eme & Ugwu, 2011). Thus, theoretically public service positions are supposed to be 
filled on the basis of merit. However, in practice empirical evidences suggest that guideline 
for recruitment is not mostly adhered to in the recruitment of personnel into the Nigerian 
public service. The abandonment of the guideline for recruitment into public service 
inadvertently opens the gate of entry into the service for incompetent persons. This to a large 
extent affects the performance of the Nigerian bureaucracy in the area of policy articulation, 
implementation and evaluation (Adeyemo & Osunyikanmi, 2009). Various reasons account 
for the non-meritocratic recruitment into public services in Nigeria. These categories of 
factors fall into structural (Nnoli, 1980; Yusufu, 1992; Adebayo, 2001) and political 
problems. The structural factors shall be majorly discussed under this section while adequate 
attention shall be given to the political factors under subsequent chapters of this work. 
Taking a retrospective look at one of the major factors that have affected the 
efficiency of the Nigerian bureaucracy is the policy of indigenenization/Nigerianization of 
the public service. It is on record that immediately after independence, the Nigerian 
government embarked on filling every public office occupied by expatriates during 
colonialism with its citizens. Ironically during this period there were few numbers of experts 
or technocrats who can perform the functions which requires technical expertise. Thus in the 
spirit of indigenization of the Nigerian public service the foundation for the non-meritocratic 
recruitment into the public service was laid. This continued several years after Nigerian 
independence despite some reform agenda by various governments in the country. 
Furthermore, recruitment into the public service, especially those of junior staff on 
salary Grade Levels 01-06 delegated to ministers/extra-ministerial officers have mostly being 
done on the basis of the personal interest of the recruiting officer and for the reduction of 
rates of unemployment in the country. Phillips (1991) subscribes to this position when he 
asserts that too little qualified personnel are hired in the Nigerian public service at the top 
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levels and too many support staff. A service-wide study conducted by the Management 
Services Office of the Head of Service of the Federation in 2001 reveals that the Junior 
(unskilled) staff on Grade Levels 01-06 constituted about 70% of the entire workforce, while 
Grade Levels 15 and above (Managerial levels) constituted 7% of the total force (Guardian 
Newspaper, 24th May, 2001). The high number of junior staff in the Nigerian public service is 
linked to the fact such position are used to reduce the high rate of unemployment in the 
country. Relatedly, most people who are recruited into the public service are those who 
couldn’t find a place in the private sector which is known for the recruitment of the best 
hands and have remuneration far above those paid to the public servants.  
The principles of federal character and quota system for recruitment into public 
offices have also impacted negatively on the meritocratic recruitment in the service (Eme & 
Ugwu, 2011; Ogunronfa, 2012). The term “federal character” was introduced to ensure equal 
representation of the various units or sections in the Nigerian bureaucracy and public offices 
(Maduabum, 2008). The 1999 constitution of Nigeria which adequately entrenched this 
principle states that: 
The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the 
conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such manner as to reflect the federal 
character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command 
national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons 
from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government 
or in any of its agencies (Section 14(3) of the Nigerian 1999 constitution) 
The principles of federal character and quota system are not entirely a wrong policy 
considering the rate of ethnic division of the country. However, in most instances these 
principles have been abused because in the spirit of implementing the principles purely 
personal and regional interests have been used in recruitment into public service and for 
political appointments in various ministries, agencies and parastatals. This has to a large 
extent affected the quality of those recruited into the service. Thus, these principles have 
frustrated professionalism and competence in the Nigerian public service. As Maduabum 
(2008) aptly argues “since access to employment is not open to everybody, the ‘lucky 
anointed’ few, who in most cases, do not have the required skills, perform responsibilities 
that are meant for professionals”(Maduabum, 2008:172). 
The subversion of merit in recruitment into public service positions in Nigeria caused 
by structural problems explained above has also led to the over-bloating of the civil service 
and the numbers of agencies and parastatals in the country. Under a Harmonized Report of 
the 20 editions of a workshop attended by 1,902 Directorate Level officers in the Federal 
Civil Service, between 1999 and 2001 it was discovered among other things that there have 
been massive expansion in the size of the public service which had risen 350% between 1960 
and 1999 compared with a national population increase of 160% over the same period (Eme 
& Ugwu, 2011). Similarly, from 1999 to 2012 the total strength of the Nigerian civil service 
has increased tremendously with no actual data of the staff strength available anywhere. It 
should be noted that as observed earlier under this section the bloating of the service is at the 
lowest cadre which accounts for 70% of the total workforce. And as Maduabum points out, 
“there is also a parading atmosphere of non-creative engagement of the remaining 30% at the 
officer’s level in productivity assignment” (Maduabum, 2008:641). What this suggests is that 
the Nigerian bureaucracy is over-populated with so many unmerited and unproductive civil 
servants and which has also resulted to a situation whereby 80% of the government budget is 
directed towards recurrent expenditure, while the remaining 20% is meant for capital 
expenditure. 
Similar to the above point and as also stated earlier is the fact that there is 
proliferation of parastatals, as well as the creation of several agencies which has resulted in 
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unnecessary duplication of functions and mandates.At present the country has over sixty 
various parastatals and agencies who are without mission and vision statements, or clear 
corporate and individual schedule of duties. These paratstatals and agencies have different 
board chairmen and members on the pay roll of the government, while at the same time 
having their independent staff that forms part of the bloated public service. 
Promotion in the Nigerian public service also follows similar pattern like that of 
recruitment. Promotion at the junior and middle carrier level are mostly done on the basis of 
seniority and favoritism. Okafor (2005) puts this in a proper perspective when he holds that: 
…Once ensconced in a bureaucratic position, officials are promoted primarily on 
the basis of seniority. Rules for promotion fail to differentiate between productive 
and non-productive workers (Okafor, 2005:67) 
Officials are the directorate levels are however promoted on the basis of the principle 
of federal character and not on the basis of performance. That is why it is not uncommon in 
the public service to see civil servants been promoted to the position of Permanent Secretaries 
above those they met on the job and those that are more productive. This situation is made 
worse due to the fact that appointment as a permanent secretary which happens to be a vital 
decision making position in the civil service is done at the discretion of the president. The 
president while appointing the permanent secretaries mostly considers the need to fill slot of 
various segments of the country instead of matching employees’ skills with the needs of the 
position. 
Other pronounced features of the bureaucracy and technocracy in Nigeria is that fact 
that on-the- job training are weak and ineffective (Adebayo, 2001), poor remuneration of 
bureaucrats and technocrats (Ejiofor, 1987; Fajonyomi, 1998; 1998; Okoh, 1998; Onyeoruru, 
2005). In fact remuneration in the public service is too low to attract the best in the society. 
This allows the private sector, such as oil companies, financial institutions, 
telecommunication companies, construction companies, etc to recruit the best. As Fajonyomi 
posits  
“the disparity between the public and private wages is so wide that those who take 
up public service jobs do so for absence of something better…Consequently, the civil 
service lacks the high level competence required, not only to formulate development 
policies, but also to convince prospective investors on the actual state of the 
economy. (Fajonyomi,1998:64).  
 
Technocrats and Bureaucrats in the Development Process of Nigeria 
Since the restoration of electoral democracy in Nigeria till the time of the 
administration led by President Goodluck Jonathan, it has become a common practice for 
each regime to constitute an economic team, especially at the beginning of their tenures. 
Members of the various teams are expected to manage the economy in order to promote 
economic development of the country and engendered an efficient and dynamic self reliant 
economy (Nigeria Intel, April 8, 2013). Most of the members and the leaders of this team are 
technocrats. Apart from the economic team and the National Planning Commission, some of 
the ministers and other aides of the president are either technocrats or bureaucrats. In fact, 
according to Kifordu (2011) 6.6 and 19.7 percent of bureaucrats and technocrats are recruited 
into ministerial positions between 1999 and 2007. 
The Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration who was the first president after the return 
of electoral democracy engaged the services of technocrats, though not as a cohesive group. 
These technocrats appointed by Obasanjo were accomplished individuals in their respective 
areas. Such include Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, who was once a director at the World Bank and 
one of the Bank’s Managing Directors between October 2007- July 2011. Okonjo-Iweala 
who holds doctorate Degree in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 
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United States was also appointed minister of finance and the coordinating Minister of the 
Economy by the Goodluck Jonathan’s administration. With her position as the Cordinating 
Minister of the Economy she heads the economic management team-comprising selected 
governors, ministers, manufacturers and the Central Bank of Nigeria. In her capacity she 
oversees the economic policy thrust of the economy (Masterweb Reports, 2013). 
The National Economic Management Team in Nigeria is similar to the Council of 
Economic Advisers (CEA) in the United States. It is an agency within the Executive Office of 
the President and it advises the President of the United States on economic policy. The team 
in United State is made up of renowned economists and policy wonks (Sahara 
ReportersSeptember 09, 2012) The Nigerian team also has some technocrats and economists 
as members. Some of them include Barth Nnaji, a Professor of Mechanical and Industrial 
Engineering at the University of Massachusetts Amherst has on different occasion been a 
Special Adviser to President Goodluck Jonathan on Power and Chairman, Presidential 
taskforce on Power. Another member of the team that readily attracts attention is Mallam 
Sanusi Lamido, Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) (Vanguard Newspaper, 20 
August, 2011). Though the Nigerian economic team is made up of some technocrats but 
majority of them are those that have business interests in Nigeria, such as Aliko Dangote, 
Femi Otedola,Aig Imoukhuede, and those that have been recycled in government over the 
years.  
It has become the usual practice for different civilian governments in Nigeria to 
appoint some technocrats to embark on reforms in the financial sector, judicial sector, and 
public sector, among others (Mustapha, 2006).It is however instructive to note that the 
various administrations from 1999 to 2013 have witnessed economic team and cabinet 
instability occasioned by regular change of members of the team and ministers. Few 
examples are sufficed to buttress this position. At the end of the first year of the 
administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999, one-third of the 30 ministers were 
either rotated or replaced. By the third year, additional 12 ministers were replaced, and by the 
start of his second term of office in 2003, only four ministers from the first term survived 
their posts. In fact, Dr Okonjo-Iweala, an economist, who happened to be head of the 
economic team during the first term administration of Obasanjo was removed as a result of 
her rising public profile and ‘demoted’ to the post of minister of affairs while away in 
London negotiating the final phase of debt cancellation for Nigeria (Akinyoade, 2009). In 
fact Dr Shamsudeen Usman a seasoned economist who happens to be the longest serving 
minister (This Day Newspaper, 12 September, 2013) from 2007-2013 was removed as the 
Minister of National Planning under non convincing circumstances. 
What the above also suggests is that the Ministry of National Planning which is very 
important to development planning was not also spared of the instability of office of 
appointed technocrats. The ministry has the mandate to determine policies relating to 
National Development and overall management of the national economy. The ministry aims 
at efficient planning that guides the growth and development of Nigerian economy to be and 
among the leading economies in the world. Furthermore, it determines and efficiently advise 
on matters relating to national development and overall management of the economy for 
positive growth; and to ensure that plans and policies are properly implemented by all 
relevant stakeholders (whoiswho, 2013). Despite these important functions of the ministry 
and the need for long term planning no minister spent more than four years as a minister of 
National Planning. Usman remains the longest serving minister in the ministry who served 
for about four years in that position (before becoming the minister of National Planning he 
was the minister of Finance from 2007-2009). 
What this scenario portends is that no technocrats and bureaucrats appointed to 
development relevant and ministerial positions occupied such position for a period of four 
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years. More so, only few ministers occupy their positions on expertise, knowledge and 
professional expertise. This has negative impact on development policy choice and outcome. 
Akinyoade attests to this when he points out that “respective ministers do not have enough 
time to digest their mandate and come up with plans that tie into the federal government 
strategic plans and business plans in a way that ensures effective achievement and monitoring 
of target goals” (2009:13). 
Similarly, selected ministers are not given adequate opportunity to have independent 
choice in the formulation and implementation of workable strategic plans. This is informed 
by the fact that the hardly concentrate on their duties before they are relieved of their 
position. Most often technocrats are sacked from their position when general elections are 
approaching in order to pave the way for appointment of political loyalists that would help in 
securing victory in elections for the ruling party.  
The above situation is made worse due to the fact that the bureaucracy which should 
serve as a gap for policy instability occasioned by instability of office of technocrats is not 
only inefficient, but also not autonomous. The end result of this is policy making that is 
dominated by politicianswith limited role for the bureaucracy.  
 
Conclusion 
Using the developmental theorist argument to explain developmental outcomes 
prominently gives the bureaucracy and technocracy important roles in the process of 
development. Thus, an efficient bureaucracy and technocracy remain invaluable in the 
process of development. It is however important to point out that the nature and character of a 
country’s techno-bureaucratic governance determines development outcome. So, one of the 
logical explanation for the movement of Botswana from a state of underdevelopment to 
development can be anchored on the the autonomy and efficiency of techno-bureaucratic 
governance in the country. 
Therefore, I argued strongly that in order to enhance development through a state-
centric approach an autonomous and efficient bureaucracy and technocracy remain 
invaluable. Under this process of development the expectation is that seasoned technocrats 
and bureaucrats should be given the opportunity of occupying positions relevant for 
economic development. The technocrats and bureaucrats should not only be given prominent 
roles in these development relevant positions, but they should also be engaged in a rather 
considerable long period of time. This is of utmost importance because policy formulation 
and implementation requires adequate time for it to achieve its required goal. Going by this 
argument, it is expedient to point out that for African countries dreaming of development 
their bureaucracy should be efficient and autonomous, while technocrats should be appointed 
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